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The present essay attempts a cohesive reading of
the varied perspectives found in the collection. It is itself
an animal story, although one thrice removed from a
direct narrative about animals. It is necessarily a
commentary on accounts in the philosophy of science
regarding animal behavior scientists' studies, them
selves accounts of animals. In fairness to the editors
and authors of this fme anthology, before I tell that story
let me locate myself as a storyteller.
I am interested in the ethics of relations "between
the species," more particularly between human and
nonhuman animals, and most particularly between
scientists and educators and their nonhuman "subjects."
What will be the results of this revival of interest in
animal minds on the treatment of animals in science?
How will it affect the numbers of animals used, the
conditions under which they are housed, the degree of
invasiveness of their treatment? .
My own position on the ethics and scientific merit
of animal research leads me to favor a significant
reduction in the numbers of animals used in research,
notably when they are used as models of complex
human phenomena. I also am critical of the use of a lab
setting and, specifically, of the caging of animals of
most species (Shapiro, 1989), preferring a style of
research and education which can be conducted in
naturalistic or seminaturalistic settings. On ethical,
scientific validity and pedagogical grounds, I also favor

Introduction

Stories about nonhuman animals continue to
fascinate us as they have since Aristotle. A phrase
recently employed in a moral philosophical account of
animals. "animals matter," can also be applied to animal
stories-they matter too. For our accounts of animals
are a powerful influence on our attitudes toward and
practices involving animals.
Of course, all animal stories are accounts both of
animals and, whether explicitly or only implicitly, of
their storytellers. The authors of this set of 21 essays
are biologists, philosophers, and psychologists who
share a common concern with "a revival of interest in
the study of animal minds" (p. xx) [all references are to
the book under review unless otherwise indicated]. They
discuss a host of questions centering on whether there
can be a science of animal minds, what it might look
like, and what its methods and rules of evidence can
be. Their attempts to answer these and other questions
in the philosophy of science result in these conceptually
dense but nonetheless engaging stories about animals,
science, and scientists.
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research and educational approaches that feature
relatively nonmanipulative and noninvasive data
gathering methods. My position is that we will always
study animals where they are and how we are. The only
legitimate question in the current debate is whether we
will continue to have a science that believes it must or
should alxJ:uct, produce, and deform animals to study them.
In addition to the direct and concrete effects of this
evolving research development, I am also concerned
with its influence on society's attitudes and practices
involving animals. Both the practices ofanimal behavior
science, the ways in which laboratory animals are
actually treated, and the research results, the descriptions
of the capabilities, sensibilities and needs of animals,
have a considerable impact on how we as a society are
educated both formally and informally to think about
and treat animals.
I will address the former, more concrete concerns
briefly-for I can only offer some impressions, mostly
from my own field of psychology.
There are several subfields within psychology which
utilize animals in research. Judging by the trend in the
number of doctorate degrees granted annually,
experimental (including behavioristic psychology),
comparative and physiological psychology all have
declined in recent years (American Psychological
Association Monitor, May 1987). This trend may
indicate a decline in the number of animals used in
these subfields. There is also some evidence of a
decline in the degree of invasiveness (suffering, injury,
harm) in psychological experimentation, although the
evidence is mixed (Field, 1988). However, much highly
invasive research continues to be conducted (Field,
1990), particularly in physiological psychology and
neuroscience and by politically prominent psychologists
(Shapiro, Field and Carr, 1990). Most research involving
animals is lab-based, although a small proportion of
comparative psychology involves field work
(Dewsbury, 1984).
In psychology, the return to the study of the mental
life of animals is part of the shift which began as early
as the mid-1950's from a behavioristic to a cognitive
psychology. In biology, an analogous and more recent
shift is underway from classical ethology to a cognitive
ethology. It is difficult to judge the role of these shifts
in the trends just indicated or in future trends. However,
a reading of the studies cited in the two of the four
sections in the volume under review that deal
relatively more directly with actual research than with
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philosophical issues ("Recognition, choice, and play"
and "Communication and language") is at least
suggestive. Most of the studies cited on recognition and
choice are field rather than lab research, most of them
involve invertebrates, and most are relatively
noninvasive. Studies cited on communication and
language include more lab-based but still relatively
noninvasive research. On the other side, these latter
studies rely heavily on the use ofprimates. Further, there
are occasional references throughout the volume to
invasive lab research: spinal cats, rats killing mice in
lab enclosures, and isolation-reared monkeys.
We tum now to the possible impacts of the scientific
interest in animals' minds on society's treatment of
animals. This will require an analysis of a number of
philosophical issues for, as the editors point out, "What
we do in our analyses of animal behavior, how we do
it, and how information is interpreted, explained and
disseminated all hang together" (p. xxi).
Cognitivism
The shift in both psychology and biology to the "re
minding" of animals is called cognitivism. Both
behavioristic psychology and classical ethology denied
or avoided attributing a mental life to animals. Radical
behaviorism's concepts of stimulus, response and
reinforcement purposely excluded purpose, intention
and subjectivity, Classical ethology's concepts of
instinct, releasers, and ftxed action pattern also avoided
mentalist talk of expectation and emotional life. By
using metaphors borrowed from mechanics and
hydraulics, both avoided casting animals in a human
shape. As a result, the characters in their animal stories
tended to be mechanomorphs. Governed by simple
mechanisms, they are beings without subjectivity,
without a consciously experienced or lived world.
The choice of this physicalistic explanatory style is
"[hung] together," at least in the case of behaviorism,
with an experimental method featuring quantifiable
stimuli and responses and, typically, a subject matter
that suggested rather limited cognitive sophistication
in the animals under study. This general approach is
largely intelligible in terms of the attempts of these
incipient behavioral sciences to emulate the positivism
of the regnant 19th century physical sciences.
With the advent ofcognitivism, there is increasingly
an openness to locate and study a more sophisticated
subject matter. Further, whether "communicative
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pretend play" or "habitat choice" or "kin recognition,"
these phenomena are no longer explained or explained
away in behaviorist talk of simple forms of associative
learning or adaptationist talk of the workings of natural
selection on evolving genotypes.
As the predominant discourse in this volume,
cognitivism invokes the metaphor of information.
Animals gather, select, encode, store, retrieve and, in
a word, process information. For example, here is
Smith on communication in animals: "Communication
cannot be understood without taking into account the
mental operations that integrate information from
many sources" (p. 234). "[The individual] appears
actively to organize and store acquired knowledge to
provide an essential foundation of information for its
continuous anticipation of circumstances. The
mechanisms of its operations are the focus of cognitive
research (p. 234, emphases added)." This discourse
derives partly from computer science and partly from
the attempt to understand, simulate and even create
human intelligence artificially through computer
hardware and software. Applied to the study of
animals' minds, at first glance it is a cryptomechano
morphism which merely replaces Cartesian pulleys
with cybernetic feedback loops.
Indeed, the processing of information is often
couched in a kind of machine talk. But as we will
describe following Dennett (1983) and as the
emphasized terms quoted above show, as often this talk
is mixed with intentionalistic discourse. An individual
animal (and sometimes his or her mental structure itselt)
is said to anticipate, predict or plan. Further, in addition
to or at the center of the working out of the "mechanics"
of cognitive processing is a concept of representation.
Talk of the forms by which information is represented
in an animal's mind quickly overextends most
metaphors of mechanics. It is typically replaced by the
language of language: Information is represented in the
linguistic form of propositions or rules. (Minority
positions are that the mode ofrepresentation is imagistic
[Shepard and Cooper, 1982] or even bodily [Shapiro,
1990] rather than linguistic).
Once granting the capacity of representation, further
sophisticated attributes of the mental life of animals
readily follow. If animals process and store information
that represents the world, then their mental life bas
"intentionality," in the broad philosophical sense ofthat
term as being about (intending) things in the world. To
say that animals have intentions about the world and
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act on them is to say that they have concepts and beliefs.
(However, Davidson, as against Dennett, takes the
position that belief possession requires full-blown
linguistic capacity [Dupre, p. 440] lacking in animals.)
And if first order intention (beliefs, desires about
things), why not second order intention (beliefs, desires
about another animal's beliefs, desires) or even third
order intention (Mitchell, p. 208)? In fact, as these
investigators think through certain sophisticated
phenomena for us, we see that almost by definition play
and genuine communication involve intentional sharing,
influence, and involvement among individuals.
It is partly in this context that Dennett offers his
suggestion that those studying animal behavior adopt
the everyday intentionalist language of beliefs, desires
and intentions in place both of "behaviorese" and
cognitivist talk of information processing (Dennett,
1983, p. 343). Of course, Dennett would have
investigators hedge their bet, in that the recommended
intentional stance denotes only a .commitment to an
explanatory style that works (is predictive). It does not
imply any commitment to an ontological position which
holds that animals are in fact intentional beings.
With these attributions of information processing,
representation, intention, belief and concept, the shared
concern among these thoughtful investigators is not
letting in a modernized version of mechanomorphism.
Their concern is with that old specter anthropo
morphism. As Fisher (p. 115) suggests, the charge of
anthropomorphism is overapplied, being based on an
overinclusive understanding of the term. The term
should be limited to the attribution "of exclusively
human characteristics to animals" (Noske, 1990, p. 62).
It refers to that class oferrors that give animals a human
form they do not in fact share with us.
Of course, some concern with anthropomorphism
is a necessary safeguard against a popular culture which
humanizes all manner of nonhuman animals. Some of
it also is part of the "healthy skepticism" (Galef, p. 91)
of a scientific process that is careful not to distort and,
in particular, not to inflate either the description or
explanation of the object of study. Associated with the
constructive side of a positivistic approach to science,
this critique is evident in a number ofthe present essays.
For example, against claims that certain species of
animals transmit behavior through complex forms of
intergenerational social behavior which is then
appropriately termed "tradition," Galef argues that
"simple acquisition processes" (p. 91 ), such as direct
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as meaningful, as an embodied consciousness, action
is only known by inference. (Dupre [p. 438] makes a
similar argument in Wittgensteinian terms, rather than
in the phenomenological terms I use here.) We do not
see an animal retreating in or as his or her posture and
movement; we only infer his or her retreat after the fact
of the leave-taking. In other words, despite what is no
doubt the intimate sense and knowledge these authors
have of their animal subjects, they will not speak from
that. They disqualify the understanding gained from
their own hard·earned attempts to empathize,
participate, and be involved with animals.
A number of the authors here do grapple with these
issues. In my view, Clark in theory and Mitchell in
practice clearly overcome the Cartesian legacy. Dupre
at least hedges the bet by arguing for the adoption of
Dennett's recommended intentional stance.
This emerging cognitive ethology is a mix of neo
Kantianism, computer science and methodological
behaviorism. As such, in my view it may not be an
enterprise with a stable future. It will likely crystallize
into a reductive physiological discourse on the one side
and an interpretive science on the other. Unfortunately,
in my view, this latter will not be acceptable to most
current investigators and will not be given any standing
either in biology or psychology. By interpretive science,
I mean something close to an "anthropology," if you
will, of nonhuman animals. In this science as in
anthropology, the objects of study are not uprooted or
manipulated. They are studied where they are and how
they are. Further, in this enterprise, it is recognized that
understanding is gained by an empathic and, where
possible, a participatory observation and that it consists
in a cohesive interpretation of those lives as they are
lived by the individuals studied.

reinforcement, can account for these so-called
traditional behaviors.
However, much of the continued over-application
ofthe charge of anthropomorphism against research into
animals' minds reflects a positivistic preoccupation with
validity and other vestiges of the Cartesian under
pinnings of positivistic science. To varying degrees the
present authors have assimilated the numerous critiques
of positivism from both within and without the natural
scientific establishment (Shapiro, 1986). In practice, this
means that they accept that the results of their empirical
investigations cannot achieve certainty. They recognize
that, as investigators, they are embedded in individual
concerns, language habits (such as those implied by
Fentress [pp. 7-35] in the selection of categories to
describe behavior), and cultural biases (such as that
described by Gruen [pp. 56-74] as gendered knowledge),
all of which prevent access to the transparent and
universal truth claimed possible by positivistic lights.
However, in my view many of the present
contributors still harbor remnants of positivism and
Cartesianism. This results in overly suspicious and rigid
concerns about providing an inflated understanding of
their own or other researchers' results. These concerns
are often couched in terms of the charge of anthropo
morphism. For example, beyond the obligatory nod to
Morgan's Canon, that the contributors are still more
comfortable with an explanation which reduces any
apparent indication of an animal's mental life to some
form of mechanistic friction points to the continued
presence of the Cartesian orthodoxy that only humans
have a mental life.
More subtly and more pervasively, they still
conceive of the mental, whether attributed to human or
animal, as that doubly unobservable Cartesian
"nonstuff." The mindful is both irretrievably inside
the body and not of the body, being precisely "mental,"
disembodied, incorporeal. Given this radical inacces
sibility that is the hallmark of the Cartesian isolated
ego (Dupre, pp. 428-434), we can only know another's
intentions (whether that other is human or animal) by
inference. So much for genuine intimacy. More
pertinently here, this strongly held presupposition is
an apology for the cognitivist, having let go of
behaviorism's impressively limited conceptual universe,
to retain at least a methodological behaviorism. The
mental is only known by inference from behavior
where behavior is conceived in physicalistic and
instrumentalistic terms. Rather than immediately given

"Awakening" Animals

This brings me to a further criticism of cognitivism,
one that I am particularly sensitive to as a phenome
nologist. The clear gain in cognitivism is the re-minding
of animals, a compensatory move necessitated by the
mindlessness ofbehaviorism. However, understanding
the mind is taken to mean working out the mechanisms
of information storage and processing. How this
processing is experienced by an animal or even how
or whether an animal is aware of the information
processed are questions not typically addressed in a
cognitivist style ofresearch. There is a strong, although
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often tacit, distinction between mind or mental life,
refening to representation and informational capabilities,
and consciousness, which refers to awareness. As the
behaviorist investigator practiced forgetting mind, so does
the cognitivist, mutatis mutandis, forget consciousness.
Even those cognitivists who use the intentionalist
explanatory style suggested by Dennett and talk of
animals anticipating or planning do not mean to imply
that their subjects are aware of their own plans. The
animals are not having an experience of their own plans
or of any other intention imputed to them. There is no
question ofexperiencing, of world as lived, of umwelt.
Given observations of certain behavior one can infer
plans and planning. The basis for such talk rests, in turn,
in theoretical talk of cognitive structures such as maps
and of information processing. It is behavior as
objectively observed that is explained. This move
bypasses both description and explanation of an
animal's lived world.
Given the relative philosophical sophistication of
its contributors, a virtue of the volume under review is
that there is some recognition and discussion of the
problematics of this absence (see Crisp, Akins and
Dupre, all in section IV). Here I will not rehearse their
arguments regarding the possibility of whether and how
a science ofanimal behavior, having re-minded animals,
might also give them back their awareness. Rather, in
the remainder of this review I will discuss the
implications of the fact that most of the substantive
(more empirical) essays on particular animal
phenomena eschew talk ofconsciousness. In particular,
I will share my concerns about the ethical implications
of this absence. (Note that the formal discussion of
ethics occurs in the second volume of this anthology,
which is not under review here).
An enterprise that takes subjectivity as the object of
its study does not promise that its animal subjects (in
this context "subjects" may be, finally, actually taken
as that) will be treated ethically. Any knowledge can be
used to exploitative ends. On the other hand, as the study
of the structure of prejudice shows, discrimination and
exploitation are often based on and justified by highly
external, partial (in both senses of that term), and rigidly
stereotypical knowledge. Knowledge of individuals that
is based on involvement with them, understanding in
the etymological sense of that term (standing under)
tends to dissolve such prejudicial thought and treatment.
The reluctance to allow animals their subjectivity
may be seen as yet another in a series of receding lines
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drawn for the sake of maintaining a radical cleavage
between human and nonhuman animals. As I have
argued elsewhere (Shapiro, 1990), historically such
discreteness has provided fertile ground for positions
that partake of that form of discrimination referred to
as speciesism. Jonas (1966) argues on ontological
grounds that the more compelling cleavage is between
animals and plants.
That animal/plant is a more acceptable cleavage on
ethical grounds is clear also from a glance at the several
emerging moral philosophical discourses on our
treatment of animals. The refusal of the new science of
animal behavior to give animals their world as lived costs
each of these further empirical and conceptual support.
In Singer's utilitarianism (1975), suffering of which an
individual is somehow not aware; in Regan's deontology
(1983), being the "subject of a life" that is not lived
through or lived in; in Rollin's neo-Aristotleianism
(1981), purpose that is not known; and in feminism's
"relationship" (Adams, 1990), a r~lation that is not
lived- all of these critical phenomena are thinner with
out consideration of the consciousness of the individual.
They all need the backing of a scientific discourse that is
not wary of investigating the experience of pain and
suffering, of living toward a certain end or purpose, of a
certain form of relationship with another animal ...
It is reasonable to speculate that if we had had such
a contemporary phenomenology of the well-being of
primates, the poor resolution of the regulations
implementing that provision in the recent amendments
of the Animal Welfare Act (1985) might have been
averted. (Works by Goodall [1986] and Cheney and
Seyfarth [1990], published after the passage of the
legislation, are somewhat more open to attempting an
account of primate subjectivity).
Ethical Implications

Any scientific enterprise involving research with
animal subjects has ethical implications on at least three
levels: ( 1) the direct treatment of the animals involved,
(2) the investigatory posture of the inquirer, and (3) the
substantive findings. The first has immediate ethical
cost in terms of the pain, suffering and harm of the
animal subjects. There have been some efforts to
measure this through a concept ofinvasiveness (Shapiro
and Field, 1988). The second, investigatory posture,
affects (1) and (3), but, as importantly, it influences the
general public's approach and attitude toward animals.
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In his excellent review of the frrst volume of our
two-volume anthology, Interpretation and Explanation
in the Study of Animal Behavior, Kenneth Shapiro
provides a provocative account of the strengths and
weaknesses of cognitive ethology. We would like to take
this opportunity to highlight and extend some of
Shapiro's points, and to explain more fully what we
hope to accomplish in our work on cognitive ethology.
One of our motivations, like Shapiro's, is practical.
Although there is no purely logical connection between
views about mental continuity and views about moral
continuity, we believe that there are important
psychological connections. In our view, a culture which
recognizes its behavioral and emotional kinship with
nonhuman animals is one that is likely to recognize its
moral kinship as well (Bekoff and Jamieson 1991;
Wuensch et al. 1991; Rollin 1989). The moral case for
changing our behavior with respect to nonhuman
animals has been convincingly argued by many
philosophers (see for example Singer 1990, Regan 1983,
and Sapontzis 1987). We see our work in cognitive
ethology in part as contributing to the epistemic
infrastructure that will make such moral views more
widely accepted.
Our motivations are also theoretical. In the post-World
War II period, especially in the United States, philosophy
and biology have increa.<>ingly become estranged. Tomany
biologists philosophy bas seemed irrelevant or even
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